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Chapter 11 Trustee

**IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION**

In re

VIDANGEL, INC.,

Debtor.

Bankruptcy No. 17-29073 (KRA)

Chapter 11

**REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO EMPLOY
WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP AS SPECIAL COUNSEL**

George Hofmann, in his capacity as Chapter 11 Trustee (the "Trustee") of the bankruptcy estate (the "Estate") of VidAngel, Inc. (the "Debtor"), through his undersigned counsel, hereby submits this reply memorandum in support of his application to employ the firm of Winston & Strawn LLP ("Winston & Strawn") as his special counsel pursuant to Bankruptcy Code § 327(a) and (e), and respectfully represents as follows:

1. The Debtor commenced this case under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code by filing a voluntary petition on October 18, 2017.

2. On August 28, 2019, the Court entered its Order appointing the Trustee, and the Trustee was appointed as the Debtor's Chapter 11 Trustee on that same date.

3. As the Court is well aware, a California jury in the case of Disney Enterprises, et al. v. VidAngel, Inc., United States District Court for the Central District of California, Case No. 2:16-cv-04109-AB (PLAx) (the "California Litigation") assessed damages of \$62.4 million against the Debtor and in favor of the Studios.

4. As of the date of the Trustee's appointment, a preliminary injunction had been in effect in the California Litigation since December 12, 2016, which injunction prohibited among other things the Debtor's streaming of plaintiffs' copyrighted works. However, on July 12, 2019, the Studios filed a motion for a permanent injunction in the California Litigation. The Debtor filed an opposition to that motion before the Trustee's appointment. On August 23, 2019, the Court in the California Litigation conducted a hearing on the request for a permanent injunction, and took it under advisement, which was the status of the matter upon the Trustee's appointment.

5. The Trustee requested the Studios' counsel to stipulate to delay the entry of a permanent injunction pending settlement negotiations between the Trustee and the Studios. The purpose of the request was to give the parties' "breathing space" to focus on negotiations, rather than to continue to consume energy and resources in litigation. The Studios refused the Trustee's request.

6. As a result, on September 6, 2019, the Court in the California Litigation issued its permanent injunction (the "Permanent Injunction"). A copy of the Permanent Injunction is attached as Exhibit A, and for comparison the preliminary injunction is

attached as Exhibit B.

7. The Permanent Injunction is significantly broader than the preliminary injunction. While the preliminary injunction applied only to the plaintiffs, the Permanent Injunction applies not only to the plaintiffs, but also any of the plaintiffs' parents, subsidiaries, or affiliates.

8. Determining whether a particular work is copyrighted by an "affiliate" of any of the Studios has required a significant amount of time and expense by the Debtor and also the Trustee. First, what is the definition of the word "affiliate"? The Trustee, as a bankruptcy practitioner, would ordinarily turn to 11 U.S.C. § 101(2). But it is doubtful that the Court in the California Litigation had the Bankruptcy Code definition in mind when he issued the Permanent Injunction. Federal law contains numerous definitions of the word "affiliate" that are not consistent with the Bankruptcy Code definition. See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 371c(b); 15 U.S.C. § 8206; 21 U.S.C. § 350g(l)(4)(A); 46 U.S.C. § 12119(a)(1). The Trustee (and his proposed special copyright counsel, Winston & Strawn) is not aware of any definition of the word "affiliate" that applies specifically in the context of copyright law.

9. Moreover, even if the legal definition of the word "affiliate" were clear, the factual circumstances that might make a particular entity an "affiliate" of the Studios is difficult to ascertain. To provide the Court some context of the factual challenges presented, in some instances the rights to a film are subsequently transferred after a film is produced. In some instances particular types of distribution rights might be held by an entity that did not produce the film (for example, a film might be produced by

studio x, but company y might have the exclusive right to distribute that film in Canada). In some instances an entity that produced a film might be subsequently purchased by an entity that is a Studio or “affiliated” with a Studio. In some instances a film might be produced by a single purpose entity whose “affiliation”, if any, with the Studios is opaque. In some instances a film might be a joint venture among several different entities, one of which may arguably be an “affiliate” of the Studios.

10. Notwithstanding these challenges, the Trustee has done his best to immediately comply with the Permanent Injunction to the fullest extent possible.

11. After the Permanent Injunction issued, it was expected that the final judgment in the California Litigation would be issued soon by the Court in that case. Once again, the Trustee asked the Studios to stipulate to the Court in that case to delay temporarily the issuance of that judgment, to give the parties breathing space to negotiate instead of focusing resources and money on litigation activities. In particular, upon entry of the judgment in the California Litigation, the deadline for post-trial motions, which is generally 28 days after entry of the judgment, would be triggered. And, unfortunately, that 28-day deadline cannot be extended even by order of the court. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(2). Once again, the Studios refused the Trustee’s request.

12. As a result, the \$62,448,750.00 judgment against the Debtor was entered on September 23, 2019. The deadline for post-trial motions is thus October 21, 2019.

13. The question now facing the Trustee is whether it makes sense to pursue post-trial motions or not. While the Trustee would greatly have preferred an appropriate amount of time to assess the matter and come to a reasoned conclusion, the Studios

have not granted the Trustee the luxury of time. One of the tasks the Trustee has asked Winston & Strawn to perform is to advise the Trustee concerning the advisability of post-trial motions. Winston & Strawn is just coming up to speed to understand the background of this matter, and has not yet been in a position to give the Trustee this advice. As a result, the Trustee sees little choice at present but to preserve the Estate's rights and to pursue post-trial motions.

14. At the July 23, 2019 hearing in this case, the Court observed:

Well, you're putting me in a bit of a position to handicap the debtor's possibility of success on appeal. And I mean, I hate to say this, but thus far, the debtor's litigation strategies have been spectacularly unsuccessful on all fronts.

* * *

And - - I mean, I almost wonder if the debtor should be seeking a second legal opinion on the practicalities of proceeding - - continuing to seek vindication of its past streaming model rather than looking forward to new business opportunities that appear to have some prospects of being successful. I'm talking about the streaming or the original content and other streaming services.

Transcript of July 23, 2019 hearing at 15-16 (relevant pages attached as Exhibit C).

15. The Trustee now finds himself in the unenviable position the Court articulated. What if any litigation strategy should the Debtor pursue? What business should the Debtor pursue in the future? These questions are perhaps the most fundamental issues in this estate. The Trustee agrees with the Court that a second legal opinion is appropriate from an unbiased source. While the Trustee has sought the retention of Call & Jensen as his special counsel to represent him as counsel of record in the California Litigation, he requires independent unbiased advice of the highest

quality to advise the Trustee on how he ought to direct Call & Jensen. That is one of the reasons he has sought the advice of Winston & Strawn.

16. The Trustee does not believe there will be any significant overlap between the activities of Call & Jensen and Winston & Strawn. It seemed essential to the Trustee to continue to retain the services of Call & Jensen because (a) their attorneys are well qualified to continue to represent the Trustee in the California Litigation, and (b) the cost that would be required to get any other qualified California lawyers “up to speed” to pursue post-trial motions on the requisite 28 day time limit, following a two-week trial, would be prohibitive. The Studios are correct in their statement that the Trustee has agreed not to use Winston & Strawn as his counsel of record in any litigation matters. However, to be very clear, the Trustee does intent to consult with Winston & Strawn concerning the strategy that ought to be pursued in the California Litigation and other matters.

17. Given the gravity and implications of the copyright law issues in this case, the Trustee concluded he required the highest caliber legal advice obtainable. After conducting independent research and discussing the matter with Michael Elkin of Winston & Strawn, he decided it was necessary to retain that firm’s services.

18. In their Objection, the Studios “question” whether Mr. Elkin and his firm Winston & Strawn are the “right choice” to serve as special counsel; however, this unfounded assertion is based on nothing more than Mr. Elkin’s reputation as one of the preeminent litigators in the field of copyright law. While the Studios assert that Mr. Elkin has “made his career trying cases against the Studios and other copyright owners,” they

ignore the fact that Mr. Elkin has represented rights holders and tech companies alike. Over the course of his career, Mr. Elkin has represented both copyright owners and copyright users. His clients over the years include motion picture and television studios, record labels, music publishers, recording artists, song writers, cable systems, internet service providers, digital distributors and search engines. Mr. Elkin has tried major copyright cases and handled significant copyright appeals on both sides of the copyright divide, making him an excellent candidate to serve as special counsel. Mr. Elkin possesses not only deep substantive knowledge in the field of copyright, but an understanding of the perspectives implicated in the present analysis. The mere fact that Mr. Elkin and his firm have represented clients like Aereo should not—and indeed, does not—disqualify him and his associates from serving as unbiased evaluators in the present matter; if anything such experience is a testament to his skill in analyzing complicated technical issues through the lens of copyright law.

19. In seeking out the best possible advice in this case, the Trustee deliberately sought out an attorney who had experience in high profile copyright litigation adverse to entities such as the Studios. The reason for this is that the Trustee wanted advice from someone who had advised entities similarly situated to the Debtor. The fact that Mr. Elkin has in the past represented clients like Aereo is one of the reasons the Trustee seeks to retain his firm.

20. The Trustee submits that the Studios' complaints about the cost of retaining Winston & Strawn are not sincere. The Studios in the Trustee's estimation are not primarily acting to advance their economic interests in this Estate. Were it

otherwise, one would have expected the Studios to have agreed to put litigation activities on hold pending settlement negotiations.

21. The Court of course has broad discretion in whether and on what terms it approves the retention of Winston & Strawn. The Trustee respectfully requests the Court not to hamstring his ability to get the highest quality legal advice available to make the weighty copyright law decisions that he faces.

22. Obviously, any compensation paid to Winston & Strawn is ultimately subject to Court review and the scrutiny of creditors through the fee application process. If their fees are unreasonable, they should not be approved, and the Studios will have the ability to object to any fees that are not reasonable. Artificially confining the Trustee to a \$50,000 cap is not reasonable. It may well be that Winston & Strawn's fees are less than \$50,000, and the Trustee hopes that is the case, but it is not appropriate in the Trustee's view for the Studios to micromanage the activities and scope of employment of Winston & Strawn.

23. Certainly Winston & Strawn's hourly rates are higher than normally approved in this district. But that is the cost of retaining very high profile counsel. And it bears emphasis that Winston & Strawn has agreed to substantial discounts compared with the rates it normally charges other clients. The discounted proposed rate of Mr. Elkin of \$950 is approximately 2/3 of his normal rate of \$1,405, and the rate of associate attorney Emily Elkin is also discounted from her normal rate of \$615 per hour down to \$590 per hour.

24. “[W]ide latitude is generally afforded to the trustee in the selection of professional persons to be employed . . .” 3 Collier on Bankruptcy ¶ 327.01 (16th ed.); accord In re James F. Humphreys & Assocs., 547 B.R. 190, 193 (Bankr. W. Va. 2016). As one court stated: “In exercising its approval function, however, the bankruptcy court should interfere with the trustee’s choice of counsel “[o]nly in the rarest cases,” such as when the proposed attorneys has a conflict of interest, or when it is clear that “the best interest of the estate” would not be served by the trustee’s choice. In re Smith, 507 F.3d 64, 71 (2d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).

25. Courts have also recognized that the “Bankruptcy Code clearly provides the Trustee with the authority to hire professionals without the interference of creditors.” In re Hash, 472 B.R. 866, 866 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 2012); accord In re Great Lakes Factors, Inc., 337 B.R. 657, 660 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2005) (“a trustee is generally entitled to select his or her own attorney, without interference from individual creditors and other parties in interest.”).

26. In this district, a trustee’s business judgment is generally assessed under the venerable standards of In re Curlew Valley Assocs., 14 B.R. 506, 513 (Bankr. D. Utah 1981), where Judge Mabey said: “[I]n other words, so long as the trustee can articulate reasons for his conduct (as distinct from a decision made arbitrarily or capriciously), the court will not inquire into the basis for those reasons.” Id. at 514 fn.11a.

27. In words which are directly applicable to the matter at hand, this Court in Curlew Valley found: “disagreements over business policy are not amenable to judicial

resolution. The courtroom is not a boardroom. The judge is not a business consultant. While a court may pass upon the legal effect of a business decision, (for example, whether it violates the antitrust laws), this involves a process and the application of criteria fundamentally different from those which produce the decision in the first instance. In short, the decision calls for business not legal judgment.” Id. at 511.

WHEREFORE, the Trustee respectfully requests the Court to authorize his employment of Winston & Strawn as his special counsel, and to overrule the Studios’ objection.

Dated: September 26, 2019

COHNE KINGHORN, P.C.

/s/ George Hofmann

GEORGE HOFMANN

Attorneys for Trustee

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that on September 26, 2019, I electronically filed the **REPLY MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF TRUSTEE'S APPLICATION TO EMPLOY WINSTON & STRAWN, LLP AS SPECIAL COUNSEL** with the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Utah by using the CM/ECF system. I certify that the parties of record in this case as identified below, are registered CM/ECF users, and will be served notice of entry of the foregoing Order through the CF/ECF System:

- J. Thomas Beckett tbeckett@parsonsbehle.com, ecf@parsonsbehle.com;brothschild@parsonsbehle.com;kstankevitz@parsonsbehle.com
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- Brian M. Rothschild brothschild@parsonsbehle.com, ecf@parsonsbehle.com
- United States Trustee USTPRegion19.SK.ECF@usdoj.gov

/s/ George Hofmann

EXHIBIT "A"

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
WESTERN DIVISION

DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
LUCASFILM LTD. LLC;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORPORATION; WARNER BROS.
ENTERTAINMENT INC.; MVL FILM
FINANCE LLC; NEW LINE
PRODUCTIONS, INC.; and TURNER
ENTERTAINMENT CO.,

Plaintiffs,

vs.

VIDANGEL, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:16-cv-04109-AB (PLAx)
**[PROPOSED] ORDER GRANTING
PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
PERMANENT INJUNCTION**

Judge: Hon. André Birotte Jr.

1 Upon reviewing the legal argument and evidence presented by Plaintiffs
2 Disney Enterprises, Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Film
3 Corporation, Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc., MVL Film Finance LLC, New Line
4 Productions, Inc., and Turner Entertainment Co. (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) in
5 support of their Motion for Permanent Injunction (“Motion”); and having reviewed
6 the opposition legal argument and evidence presented by Defendant VidAngel, Inc.
7 (“VidAngel”); and having considered (i) the irreparable injuries that Plaintiffs have
8 suffered as the result of VidAngel’s infringement of the works in which Plaintiffs
9 own or control the copyrights and VidAngel’s circumvention of technological
10 protection measures (“TPMs”) that control access to the Copyrighted Works; (ii) the
11 inadequacy of remedies available at law to compensate Plaintiffs for their injuries;
12 (iii) the balance of hardships; and (iv) the public interest, the Court HEREBY
13 FINDS AND ORDERS as follows:

14 “Copyrighted Work” shall mean any work, or portions thereof, whether in
15 existence as of the date hereof or later created, in which any Plaintiff (or parent,
16 subsidiary or affiliate of any Plaintiff) owns or controls an exclusive right under the
17 Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq., including, but not limited to, the 819
18 Copyrighted Works that were at issue in the statutory damages trial held before this
19 Court from June 11, 2019, to June 17, 2019.

20 VidAngel and all of its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, and
21 all other persons in active concert or participation with any of them that receive
22 notice of the Permanent Injunction, ARE PERMANENTLY RESTRAINED AND
23 ENJOINED from:

24 (1) circumventing technological measures protecting Copyrighted Works on
25 DVDs, Blu-ray discs, or any other medium;

26 (2) copying Copyrighted Works, including but not limited to copying the
27 Copyrighted Works onto computers or servers;

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1 (3) streaming, transmitting, or otherwise publicly performing or, facilitating
2 any third party in streaming, transmitting, or otherwise publicly performing, any
3 Copyrighted Works over the Internet (including without limitation through the
4 VidAngel.com website or any other website owned or controlled by VidAngel or
5 with which VidAngel or any person restrained by this Permanent Injunction acts in
6 concert); via web applications (including without limitation through platforms such
7 as the Windows App Store, Apple’s App Store, the Amazon App Store, Facebook,
8 or Google Play); via portable devices (including without limitation through
9 applications on devices such as iPhones, iPads, Android devices, smart phones or
10 tablets); via media streaming devices (including without limitation the Roku,
11 Chromecast, or Apple TV devices); or by means of any other device or process; or

12 (4) engaging in any other activity that violates, directly or indirectly,
13 Plaintiffs’ anti-circumvention right, 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A), or that infringes by
14 any means, directly or indirectly, any Plaintiff’s exclusive rights in any Copyrighted
15 Work under Section 106 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 106.

16 This Permanent Injunction shall not apply to Defendant’s use of a
17 Copyrighted Work as to which Defendant has obtained the relevant Plaintiff’s (or
18 relevant parent’s, subsidiary’s, or affiliate’s) express written authorization for such
19 use, during the period in which such authorization is valid.

20 The Permanent Injunction is effective immediately.

21 The Permanent Injunction replaces the Preliminary Injunction (Dkt. 144).
22 The Clerk of this Court shall return the Preliminary Injunction Bond (Dkt. 163) to
23 Plaintiffs forthwith.

24 Defendant shall forthwith give notice of this Judgment and Permanent
25 Injunction to each of its officers, agents, servants, employees, attorneys, assigns,
26 partners, owners, affiliates, representatives, successors, licensees, and all those
27 acting in concert or participation with each or any of them.

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1 This Court shall retain exclusive and continuing jurisdiction over the Parties
2 for purposes of interpreting or enforcing the Permanent Injunction.

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4 IT IS SO ORDERED

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6 DATED: September 5, 2019

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The Honorable André Birotte Jr.
United States District Judge

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11 CC: Fiscal

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EXHIBIT "B"

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

DISNEY ENTERPRISES, INC.;
LUCASFILM LTD. LLC;
TWENTIETH CENTURY FOX FILM
CORPORATION and WARNER
BROS. ENTERTAINMENT, INC.,

Plaintiff,

v.

VIDANGEL, INC.,

Defendant.

Case No. 2:16-cv-04109 – AB (PLAx)

**ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY
INJUNCTION**

Pending before the Court is Plaintiffs’ Disney Enterprises, Inc., Lucasfilm Ltd. LLC, Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation, and Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. (“Plaintiffs”) Motion for Preliminary Injunction. (“Mot.” Dkt. No. 26-1.) Plaintiffs seek to enjoin Defendant VidAngel Inc. (“VidAngel”) from [1] violating Plaintiffs’ rights pursuant to § 1201(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (“DMCA”), 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a), by circumventing technological measures that effectively control access to Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works on DVDs and Blu-ray discs; and [2] infringing by any means, directly or indirectly, Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act, *id.* § 106, including by reproducing or publicly performing Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works.

Plaintiffs bring this motion on the grounds that they are likely to succeed on the merits of their claims and that they will suffer irreparable harm, absent an injunction.

1 Plaintiffs contend that the balance of equities tips decidedly in their favor, and an
2 injunction is in the public interest. Furthermore, Plaintiffs contend that VidAngel’s
3 defenses to violating Plaintiff’s rights are meritless and thus Plaintiffs are entitled to a
4 preliminary injunction against Defendants. VidAngel filed an opposition and the
5 Plaintiffs filed their reply. The Court heard oral arguments from the parties on
6 November 14, 2016 and took the matter under submission. Upon consideration of the
7 parties’ arguments, papers and the case file, the court hereby **GRANTS** the motion for
8 preliminary injunction.

9 **I. BACKGROUND**

10 **a. Factual and Procedural Background**

11 **i. Plaintiffs and Their Copyrighted Works**

12 Plaintiffs are in the business of producing and distributing motion pictures and
13 television programs. (“Compl.” Dkt. No 1 ¶ 19.) Plaintiffs invest considerable effort
14 and resources each year to develop, produce, distribute and publicly perform their
15 Copyrighted Works. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs own and have the exclusive U.S. rights to
16 reproduce and publicly perform their Copyrighted Works, including by means of
17 streaming those works over the internet to the public. (*Id.* at ¶ 25.) Plaintiffs
18 distribute and license their content for home entertainment across a number of
19 channels. (*Id.* at ¶ 27.) These include, among others: (1) physical Discs; (2) digital
20 download through services like iTunes, VUDU or Amazon Video; (3) on-demand
21 streaming for short-term viewing on a per transaction fee (e.g., iTunes Store or Google
22 Play Store); or (4) subscription on-demand streaming (e.g., Netflix or Hulu).
23 (Cittadine Decl. ¶ 9.)

24 Plaintiffs strategically release their content across different distribution
25 channels and to different licensees over time, a process called “windowing.” (*Id.*)
26 The value and price for each offering is tailored to the willingness of customers (and
27 licensees) to pay for those offerings. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs often negotiate higher licensing
28 fees in exchange for granting a licensee the exclusive right to perform a movie or
television show during a particular time period. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs assert that online and
digital distribution channels have become increasingly important revenue sources. (*Id.*
¶ 10.)

1 through the VidAngel platform in perpetuity, sell it back for \$1 or \$2 in credit, or
2 VidAngel will send the DVD to the customer, if requested. (*Id.*)

3 At the time of this motion, VidAngel offered over 80 of Plaintiff’s copyrighted
4 works on their website. (Compl. Ex. A.; Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 27:19-29:14.)
5 Plaintiffs have not provided authorization, permission or consent to VidAngel to copy
6 or publicly perform the Copyrighted Works, or to exercise any other rights affecting
7 their copyrights with respect to the Copyrighted Works. (Compl. ¶ 29.)

8 On June 9, 2016, Plaintiffs commenced this action by filing a complaint against
9 Defendants. (Complaint, Dkt. No. 1.) On July 5, 2016, Defendants filed an answer
10 and counterclaim. (Dkt. No. 11.) On August 22, 2016, Plaintiffs filed a Motion for
11 Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. 27) On September 16, 2016, Defendants filed an
12 Amended Answer and Affirmative Defenses, as well as First Amended
13 Counterclaims. (Dkt. No. 77.)

14 II. LEGAL STANDARD

15 Injunctive relief is "an extraordinary remedy that may only be issued upon a
16 clear showing that plaintiff is entitled to such relief." *Winter v. Natural Resources*
17 *Defense Council*, 555 U.S. 7, 129 S. Ct. 365, 376, 172 L. Ed. 2d 249 (2008). The
18 purpose of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo and the rights of the
19 parties until a final judgment on the merits can be rendered. *U.S. Philips Corp. v.*
20 *KBC Bank N.V.*, 590 F.3d 1091, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010). A party seeking preliminary
21 injunctive relief must establish that they are (1) likely to succeed on the merits; (2)
22 that they are likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of preliminary relief; (3)
23 that the balance of equities tips in their favor and (4) that an injunction is in the public
24 interest. *Am. Trucking Ass’n, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles*, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th
25 Cir. 2009).

26 Alternatively, “‘serious questions going to the merits’ and a hardship balance
27 that tips sharply toward the plaintiff can support the issuance of an injunction,”
28 provided that the plaintiff also shows irreparable harm and that the injunction is in the
public interest. *Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. Cottrell*, 632 F.3d 1127, 1132 (9th
Cir. 2011); A “serious question” is one on which the movant “has a fair chance of
success on the merits.” *Sierra On-Line, Inc. v. Phoenix Software, Inc.*, 739 F.2d 1415,
1421 (9th Cir. 1984).

The elements of this test are “balanced, so that a stronger showing of one
element may offset a weaker showing of another.” *Alliance for the Wild Rockies*, 622

1 F.3d 1045, 1049–50 (9th Cir. 2010), rev’d on other grounds, 632 F.3d 1127 (9th Cir.
2 2011). However, the applicant must demonstrate that immediate or imminent
3 irreparable harm is likely: “Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury
4 sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. A plaintiff must do more than
5 merely allege imminent harm sufficient to establish standing; a plaintiff must
6 demonstrate immediate threatened injury as a prerequisite to preliminary injunctive
7 relief.” *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988)
8 (emphasis in original) (internal citations omitted); see also *Fin. & Sec. Prods. Ass’n v. Diebold, Inc.*, Case No. C 04-04347 WHA, 2005 WL 1629813, *6 (N.D. Cal. July 8, 2005) (“Irreparable harm must not be speculative or merely alleged to be imminent . . .”).

9 “[A] preliminary injunction is customarily granted on the basis of procedures
10 that are less formal and evidence that is less complete than in a trial on the merits.”
11 *Univ. of Texas v. Camenisch*, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981). Therefore, the Federal Rules
12 of Evidence do not strictly apply to preliminary injunction proceedings. *See, e.g., Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos*, 862 F.2d 1355, 1363 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc);
13 *Flynt Distrib. Co. v. Harvey*, 734 F.2d 1389, 1394 (9th Cir. 1984). The Court is
14 permitted to consider inadmissible evidence in deciding a motion for a preliminary
15 injunction. *Id.* This flexibility exists because “[t]he urgency of obtaining a
16 preliminary injunction necessitates a prompt determination” and makes it difficult for
17 a party to procure supporting evidence in a form that would be admissible at trial. *Id.*
18 “While district courts may consider inadmissible evidence in the context of a
19 preliminary injunction, this does not mean that evidentiary issues have no relevance to
20 this proceeding. Such issues, however, properly go to weight rather than
21 admissibility.” *Am. Hotel & Lodging Ass’n v. City of Los Angeles*, 119 F. Supp. 3d
22 1177, 1185 (C.D. Cal. 2015) ¹

25 ¹ Both sides make numerous evidentiary objections. In light of the relaxed evidentiary standard for
26 preliminary injunction proceedings, the Court need not rule on admissibility. However, the Court has
27 considered the likely admissibility of the evidence in determining whether the Plaintiff demonstrated a
28 likelihood of success on the merits, for purposes of the preliminary injunction. Where the Court has
expressly relied on evidence that is subject to an evidentiary objection, the Court has overruled the objection.

1 decision that directly addressed issues of DVD copying and the DMCA. In *Universal*
2 *City Studios v. Corley*, 273 F.3d 429, 444 (2d Cir. 2001), the defendants argued "that
3 an individual who buys a DVD has the 'authority of the copyright owner' to view the
4 DVD, and therefore is exempted from the DMCA pursuant to subsection
5 1201(a)(3)(A) when the buyer circumvents an encryption technology in order to view
6 the DVD on a competing platform." The court responded that Section 1201(a)(3)(A)
7 only exempts from liability those "who would 'decrypt' an encrypted DVD with the
8 authority of a copyright owner, not those who would 'view' a DVD with the authority
9 of a copyright owner." *Id.* The purchase of a DVD only conveys the authority to
10 view the DVD, not to decrypt it.³ VidAngel has not offered any evidence that the
11 Plaintiffs have either explicitly or implicitly authorized DVD buyers to circumvent
12 encryption technology in order to view the DVD on a different platform such as
13 VidAngel's streaming service.

14 The Librarian of Congress, and the Register of Copyrights, also recently
15 declined to adopt an exemption that would allow circumvention of access controls on
16 lawfully made and acquired audiovisual works for the purpose of noncommercial
17 space-shifting or format-shifting. Exemption to Prohibition on Circumvention of
18 Copyright Protection Systems for Access Control Technologies, 80 Fed. Reg. 65944
19 (Oct. 28, 2015) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 201).

20 VidAngel also argues that the Family Home Movie Act of 2005 ("FMA")
21 provides an exemption for decrypting DVDs for the purpose of accessing a disk to
22 filter audio and visual content. VidAngel asserts that the provisions of the FMA
23 render their circumvention lawful because "the making of a decrypted copy [is] the
24 necessary first step in making a lawfully purchased DVD capable of being filtered."
25 (Dkt. 11 ¶ 61.) (Counter-Complaint). The FMA, codified in 17 U.S.C. § 110(11),
26 specifically carves out an exemption from copyright infringement for:

27 "the making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a
28 private household, of limited portions of audio or video content of a
motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household
for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion picture,
or the creation or provision of a computer program or other technology
that enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and

³ VidAngel asserts that former Solicitor General Don Verrilli, "while representing the major record labels *and movie studios*" in *Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster*, 545 U.S. 913 (2005), assured the Supreme Court that his clients agreed that space shifting is legal. (Oppo. at 17.) (emphasis added). However, Don Verrilli specifically stated that "*The record companies, my clients, have said, for some time now...that it's perfectly lawful to take a CD that you've purchased, upload it onto your computer, put it onto your iPod.* (RJN Ex. B at 53. (Tr. of *MGM v. Grokster* Oral Argument at 12.)) (emphasis added). This statement did not involve movie studios, nor did it address space-shifting in the context of copying DVDs.

1 marketed to be used, at the direction of a member of a private household,
2 for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of the altered version of
3 the motion picture is created by such computer program or other
4 technology”

5 17 U.S.C. § 110(11). Neither the plain language nor the legislative history of the
6 FMA support VidAngel’s position. In fact, the legislative history directly contradicts
7 VidAngel’s assertion that the FMA provides an exemption to the anti-circumvention
8 provisions of the DMCA. Senator Orrin Hatch, who introduced the FMA to the U.S.
9 Senate, stated that the FMA “does not provide any exemption from the anti-
10 circumvention provisions of section 1201 of title 17.” 150 Cong. Rec. S.11852-01 at
11 S11853 (Statement of Senator Hatch) (RJR Ex. G at 269).⁴ Senator Hatch further
12 stated that “It would not be a defense to a claim of violation of section 1201 that the
13 circumvention is for the purpose of engaging in the conduct covered by this new
14 exemption in section 110(11).” *Id.*

15 Finally, VidAngel states that in *MDY Indus., LLC v. Blizzard Entm't, Inc.*, 629
16 F.3d 928, 951 (9th Cir. 2010) the Ninth Circuit court expressly cautioned against
17 DMCA application when, as here, antitrust issues are present. (Oppo at 18.) A close
18 reading of the *MDY Indus.* decision shows that the court actually declined to consider
19 the interplay between the anti-circumvention right and antitrust. *MDY Indus.*, 629
20 F.3d at 950. The court advised that they would consider this issue “If a § 1201(a)(2)
21 defendant in a future case claims that a plaintiff is attempting to enforce its DMCA
22 anti-circumvention right in a manner that violates antitrust law.” VidAngel is not
23 alleged to have violated § 1201(a)(2) of the DMCA, which prohibits trafficking in
24 circumvention technology, and thus is not the type of defendant contemplated by the
25 court in *MDY Indus.* VidAngel’s remaining arguments also fail.⁵

26 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success
27 on the merits of their claim that VidAngel has violated, and continues to violate,
28 section 1201(a)(1)(A) of the Digital Millenium Copyright Act by circumventing
29 technological measures that effectively control access to Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works
30 on DVDs and Blu-ray discs.

⁴ Because legislative history is a matter of public record, which is not subject to reasonable dispute, the court will take judicial notice of this item. *See* FED.R.EVID. 201(b). *See also* *Palmer v. Stassinis*, 348 F.Supp.2d 1070, 1077 (C.D. Cal. 2004) (taking judicial notice of legislative history materials...because they "constitute judicial facts sufficiently capable of accurate and ready determination.")

⁵ VidAngel makes a very brief assertion that the remedies section of the DMCA makes clear that to redress violations, courts “may not impose a prior restraint on free speech,” 17 U.S.C. § 1203(b)(1). (Oppo. at 18.) VidAngel has not sufficiently briefed this issue nor otherwise argued it before the court. Therefore the Court will not reach this argument.

1 **ii. Plaintiffs’ Copyright Infringement Claims**

2 Plaintiffs must satisfy two requirements to present a prima facie case of direct
3 infringement: (1) they must show ownership of the allegedly infringed material and
4 (2) they must demonstrate that the alleged infringers violate at least one exclusive
5 right granted to copyright holders under 17 U.S.C. § 106. Plaintiffs have sufficiently
6 demonstrated ownership of the copyrighted works identified in the complaint by
7 providing certificates of registration issued by the Copyright Office. (Klaus Decl.
8 Exs. A-RR.) A certificate of registration is "prima facie evidence of the validity of the
9 copyright and of the facts stated in the certificate." 17 U.S.C. § 410(c). VidAngel has
10 not disputed that it currently offers all of the works listed in Exhibit A to the
11 complaint and states that it will continue to offer these works and other future
12 releases, unless enjoined. (Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 27:19-29:14; 30:3-20; 31:6-
13 37:4.) VidAngel also does not dispute the validity of Plaintiffs' copyrights.
14 Therefore, the only factor at issue in this case is whether Defendants have violated at
15 least one exclusive right granted to Plaintiffs as copyright holders.

16 **1. VidAngel Violates Plaintiffs’ Exclusive Right To
17 Reproduce Their Works By Making Copies**

18 One of the rights granted by Section 106 of the Copyright Act is the exclusive
19 right "to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies." 17 U.S.C. § 106(1). VidAngel
20 admits to making copies of Plaintiffs’ works onto a computer system and third-party
21 servers. (Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 58:1-4.) The Ninth Circuit in *MAI Sys. Corp. v.*
22 *Peak Computer, Inc.*, 991 F.2d 511, 518 (9th Cir. 1993) stated that transferring digital
23 work “from a permanent storage device to a computer’s RAM [or storage]” infringes
24 the reproduction right.” Although, the *MAI Sys. Corp.* decision addressed the
25 infringement of computer software, the same analysis applies to the digital transfer
26 other types of copyrighted work. *Tiffany Design, Inc. v. Reno-Tahoe Specialty, Inc.*
27 55 F. Supp. 2d 1113, 1121 (D. Nev. 1999)(“ the digitization or input of any
28 copyrighted material, whether it be computer code or visual imagery, may support a
finding of infringement notwithstanding only the briefest of existence in a computer's
RAM.”)

29 VidAngel claims that their copies of Plaintiffs’ works are only “intermediate”
30 copies and not “copies” as defined by the Copyright Act. VidAngel’s process of
31 copying involves several steps. First, VidAngel decrypts the DVDs. (Oppo. at 17.)
32 After decryption, VidAngel creates “intermediate” files. (*Id.*) VidAngel tags the files
33 for over 80 types of content, and breaks them into approximately 1,300 fragments that
34 contain no more than 10 seconds of content, then encrypts those fragments, and stores
35 them in a secure, access-controlled location in the cloud. (Meldal Dec., ¶¶ 33-38.)

1 VidAngel asserts that these fragments are not capable of being watched until
2 “VidAngel software assembles the segments in sequence, and for each segment
3 decrypts the content, displays it and then discards the segment.” (Meldal Dec., ¶
4 37(xiii)).

5 VidAngel contends that case law regarding the reproduction right under §
6 106(1) draws a clear distinction between unlawful copies, which can be viewed by
7 consumers, and lawful “intermediate” copies, which cannot be viewed. (Oppo. at 10.)
8 VidAngel argues that since their intermediate copies are unable to be viewed by
9 consumers, they are not “copies” as defined by the Copyright Act and, as a matter of
10 law, do not give rise to infringement claims. (*Id.*) Defendants cite the Ninth Circuit’s
11 decision in *Sega Enters. v. Accolade, Inc.*, 977 F.2d 1510 (9th Cir. 1992) as support
12 for their proposition that “intermediate” copying does not violate the Copyright Act.
13 However, the court in *Sega* stated that “on its face, the language of 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
14 unambiguously encompasses and proscribes ‘intermediate copying’” *Id.* at 1518. 17
15 U.S.C. § 101 provides that “in order to constitute a “copy” for purposes of the
16 Copyright Act, the allegedly infringing work must be fixed in some tangible form,
17 “from which the work can be perceived, reproduced, or otherwise communicated,
18 *either directly or with the aid of a machine or device.*” (emphasis added). VidAngel’s
19 fragmented copies may not be able to be perceived directly by consumers, however
20 they are able to be perceived with the aid of VidAngel’s software. Thus the copying
21 performed by Defendants falls within the category of acts that are proscribed by the
22 statute.

17 **2. VidAngel Violates Plaintiffs’ Exclusive Right To Publicly** 18 **Perform Their Copyrighted Works**

19 Another of the rights granted by Section 106 of the Copyright Act is the
20 exclusive right “in the case of . . . motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to
21 perform the copyrighted work publicly.” 17 U.S.C. § 106(4). What constitutes a
22 public performance for purposes of Section 106(4) is defined by the Copyright Act in
23 Section 101. “Under Section 101(2), the “transmit” clause, a performance is public if
24 someone: transmits or otherwise communicates a performance or display of the
25 work...to the public, by means of any device or process.” *Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc.*
26 *v. WTV Sys.*, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1009 (C.D. Cal. 2011). A transmission is made
27 “to the public” if “the relationship between ...the transmitter of the performance, and
28 the audience...is a commercial, ‘public’ relationship regardless of where the viewing
takes place.” *Id.* at 1010;

Plaintiffs assert that services like VidAngel’s violate the public performance
right, despite the fact that the performances are transmitted privately for in home

1 viewing. The court in *On Command Video Corporation v. Columbia Pictures*
2 *Industries*, 777 F. Supp. 787 (N.D. Cal. 1991), held that a hotel’s “electronic rental”
3 system infringed the public performance right, despite the fact that the hotel’s service
4 transmitted performances from the main office to individual hotel rooms. The court
5 held that the “relationship between the transmitter of the performance...and the
6 audience,” was “a commercial, ‘public’ one regardless of where the viewing takes
7 place.” *Id.* at 788. Likewise, the court in *Warner Bros. Entertainment Inc. v. WTV*
8 *Systems, Inc.*, held that a service which streamed the contents of DVDs from DVD
9 players purportedly assigned to individual users also violated the public performance
10 right. 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1006-07, 1010. The Supreme Court in *Am. Broad. Cos. v.*
11 *Aereo, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (“*Aereo*”), held that internet streaming of
12 copyrighted material captured from over-the-air broadcast signals by thousands of
13 separate antennae, each of which was purportedly assigned separately to individual
14 subscribers, infringed the public performance right.

15 VidAngel argues that their service does not engage in public performances
16 because VidAngel streams filtered versions of motion pictures created at the direction
17 of and owned by its customers. (Oppo. at 11.) VidAngel cites the *Aereo* decision as
18 support. There, the Supreme Court declared that a transmission of a copyrighted
19 program is not made to “the public” when it is made “to those who act as owners or
20 possessors of the relevant product.” *Am. Broad. Cos. v. Aereo, Inc.*, 134 S. Ct. at
21 2510. Assuming *arguendo* that VidAngel’s buy/sellback service creates a valid
22 ownership interest in a DVD, this ownership would only apply to the physical DVD,
23 not the digital content that VidAngel streams to paying subscribers. Subscribers view
24 a stream from a master copy stored on a server, not a DVD temporarily “owned” by
25 the user. Furthermore, lawful ownership of a DVD only conveys authorization to
26 view the DVD, not to decrypt it for the purpose of viewing it on an alternative
27 platform. *See* discussion *supra* Section III.A.i. Therefore, VidAngel’s customers are
28 not lawful “owners or possessors” of the digital content that is streamed via
VidAngel’s service. Finally, VidAngel’s argument that *Aereo* holds that the public
performance right is not infringed when the user pays for something other than the
transmission of copyrighted works, is unsupported. (Oppo. at 11.) In *Aereo*, the
Supreme Court specifically stated that they had “not considered whether the public
performance right is infringed when the user of a service pays primarily for something
other than the transmission of copyrighted works.” For the foregoing reasons, the
Court holds that Plaintiffs have shown a strong likelihood of success on the merits of
their claims that VidAngel has violated, and continues to violate, 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
and 17 U.S.C. § 106(4), by creating copies of Plaintiff’s copyrighted material, and
publicly performing Plaintiff’s copyrighted material.

3. VidAngel’s FMA Defense for Copyright Infringement

The Family Home Movie Act is codified in 17 U.S.C § 110(11). It provides an exemption from copyright infringement for:

the making imperceptible, by or at the direction of a member of a private household, of limited portions of audio or video content of a motion picture, during a performance in or transmitted to that household for private home viewing, from an authorized copy of the motion picture, or the creation or provision of a computer program or other technology that enables such making imperceptible and that is designed and marketed to be used, at the direction of a member of a private household, for such making imperceptible, if no fixed copy of the altered version of the motion picture is created by such computer program or other technology.

Plaintiffs assert, and the Court agrees that the FMA exempts only (1) “the making imperceptible” of limited portions of a motion picture; and (2) “the creation or provision of a computer program or other technology that enables such making imperceptible.” 17 U.S.C § 110(11). VidAngel’s contends that the FMA expressly provides that a third party may filter and transmit content as specified by a lawful owner of a copy so long as a fixed copy of the altered content is not created. However, this assertion is unsupported by the clear language of the statute. (Oppo. at 12.) The statute clearly requires that a performance or transmission of filtered content must come from an “authorized copy” of the motion picture. The digital content that VidAngel streams to its customers is not from an authorized copy. VidAngel streams from a digital copy that it acquires by circumventing technological protection measures on Plaintiff’s DVDs in violation of § 1201(a) of the DMCA. See discussion *supra* Sections III.A.i, III.A.ii.2. Furthermore, the requirement that the filtered content come “from an authorized copy” is a clear indication that the FMA is not intended to displace a copyright holder’s exclusive reproduction right under section 106(1) of the Copyright Act. The last sentence of the FMA also provides that: “Nothing in paragraph (11) shall be construed to imply further rights under section 106 of this title, or to have any effect on defenses or limitations on rights granted under any other section of this title or under any other paragraph of this section.” 17 U.S.C § 110(11). This language directly contradicts VidAngel’s argument that a filtering service that complies with the FMA, need not satisfy any other provisions of the Copyright Act. (Oppo. at 15.) The evidence in the record and the unambiguous language of the FMA show that (1) VidAngel’s service does not comply with the express language of the FMA, and (2) The FMA does not provide a defense to VidAngel’s violations of sections 106(1) and 106(4) of the Copyright Act.

1 with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression,
2 meaning or message." *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 579. VidAngel's service does not add
3 anything to Plaintiff's works. It simply omits portions that viewers find objectionable.
4 The court in *Clean Flicks of Colo. v. LLC v. Soderbergh*, 433 F. Supp. 2d 1236 (D.
5 Colo. 2006), rejected a fair use defense from defendants that provided a service which
6 is similar to that of VidAngel. In *Clean Flicks*, the court ruled that defendants' editing
7 of objectionable content was not transformative because it added nothing to the
8 copyrighted works, and only removed "a small percentage of most of the films." *Id.* at
9 1241. Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit has held that works are transformative when
10 "the works use copy-righted material for purposes distinct from the purpose of the
11 original material." *Elvis Presley Enters. v. Passport Video*, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th
12 Cir. 2003). Notwithstanding the edits made by users, VidAngel's use of plaintiff's
13 works serves the "same intrinsic entertainment value that is protected by Plaintiffs'
14 copyrights", and is thus not transformative. *Id.* VidAngel's commercial use of the
15 copyrighted works, coupled with non-transformative nature of the edited copies weigh
16 heavily in favor of the Plaintiffs under the first statutory factor in the fair use analysis.

17 **2. Nature of the Copyrighted Work**

18 "The second statutory factor, 'the nature of the copyrighted work,' § 107(2),
19 draws on Justice Story's expression, the 'value of the materials used.'" *Campbell v.*
20 *Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 586 (1994) (citing *Folsom v. Marsh*, 9 F. Cas.
21 342, 348 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841)) "This factor calls for recognition that some works are
22 closer to the core of intended copyright protection than others, with the consequence
23 that fair use is more difficult to establish when the former works are copied."
24 *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586. For example, the Ninth Circuit has held that "works such
25 as original songs, motion pictures, and photographs taken for aesthetic purposes, are
26 creative in nature and thus fit squarely within the core of copyright protection." *Elvis*
27 *Presley Enters. v. Passport Video*, 349 F.3d 622, 629 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing *Sony*
28 *Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc.*, 464 U.S. 417 (1984)). This factor also weighs in
favor of the Plaintiffs.

29 **3. Amount and Substantiality of the Portion Used in** 30 **Relation to the Copyrighted Work as a Whole**

31 The third factor in the fair use analysis evaluates both the quantity of the work
32 taken and the quality and importance of the portion taken. *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586.
33 "This factor calls for thought not only about the quantity of the materials used, but
34 about their quality and importance, too." *Id.* at 577. The evidence in this case shows
35 that VidAngel copies Plaintiff's works in their entirety. (Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr.
36 112:19-113:2.) The Supreme Court in *Campbell* advised that the verbatim copying of

1 "a substantial portion of the infringing work" is a relevant inquiry in the fair use
2 analysis. *Id.* at 588. VidAngel does not dispute that they copy a substantial portion of
3 the Plaintiff's copyrighted works. Instead VidAngel simply states that their viewers
4 never watch exact copies of the original films, due to the requirement that each user
5 must apply at least one filter. Defendants also assert that the filtered versions of the
6 movies are not substitutes for the Plaintiff's works. However, the Supreme Court in
7 *Campbell* held that "a work composed primarily of an original, particularly its heart,
8 with little added or changed, is more likely to be a merely superseding use, fulfilling
9 demand for the original. *Id.* The heart of a copyrighted work is the portion that is the
10 "most likely to be newsworthy and important in licensing serialization." *Campbell*,
11 510 U.S. at 586. Despite the fact that VidAngel's service omits portions of each
12 work, the essential storyline, cinematography, and acting portrayals remain
13 unchanged. These elements are the heart of the movie. Courts consistently find that
14 the performance of the "heart" of a copyrighted work weighs against a fair use
15 determination. *See Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586; *Elvis Presley Enters.*, 349 F.3d at 630;
16 *L.A. News Serv. v. Tullo*, 973 F.2d 791, 798 (9th Cir. 1992). *Arista Records LLC v.*
17 *Myxer Inc.*, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 109668 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 1, 2011). Accordingly,
18 the Court finds that this factor weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs.

14 **4. Effect of the Use Upon the Potential Market For or** 15 **Value of the Copyrighted Work**

16 The fourth factor in the fair use analysis considers current market harm and
17 "whether unrestricted and widespread conduct of the sort engaged in by the defendant
18 . . . would result in a substantially adverse impact on the potential market' for the
19 original." *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 590 (citations omitted). As discussed above,
20 Plaintiff's use of Plaintiff's copyrighted works is commercial and non-transformative.
21 The Ninth Circuit has held that when "the intended use is for commercial gain," the
22 likelihood of market harm "may be presumed." *Leadsinger, Inc. v. BMG Music*
23 *Publ'g*, 512 F.3d 522, 531. (9th Cir. Cal. 2008).

24 VidAngel argues that their service does not harm the market for Plaintiff's
25 copyrighted works because filtered movies are not a substitute for Plaintiff's
26 unfiltered movies. (*Oppo.* at 21.) VidAngel also asserts that their filtering service
27 actually increases the market for Disney's works. (*Id.*) VidAngel attempts to support
28 their arguments by offering customer survey results that indicate that over 51% of
VidAngel customers would not watch their offerings without filtering. The survey
results are ultimately detrimental to VidAngel's arguments. The fact that 49% of
VidAngel's customers would view movies without filters shows that VidAngel's
service does serve as an effective substitute for Plaintiff's unfiltered works, for
approximately half of VidAngels users. Furthermore, the fact that VidAngel's

1 streams are “composed primarily” of Plaintiff’s works, including the heart of the
2 work, “with little added or changed” makes the streams “more likely to be a merely
3 superseding use, fulfilling demand for the original.” *Campbell*, 510 U.S. at 586.
4 Therefore, the Court finds that this factor also weighs in favor of the Plaintiffs.

5 At trial, the defendant in an infringement action bears the burden of proving fair
6 use. *See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569, 590 (1994). “Because
7 ‘the burdens at the preliminary injunction stage track the burdens at trial,’ once the
8 moving party has carried its burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits,
9 the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to show a likelihood that its affirmative
10 defense will succeed.” *Perfect 10, Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc.*, 508 F.3d 1146, 1158 (9th
11 Cir. 2007) (citing *Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal*, 546
12 U.S. 418, 429 (2006)). Plaintiffs have shown a likelihood of success on their DMCA
13 and Copyright Infringement claims, therefore VidAngel bears the burden of showing
14 that they are making fair use of the Plaintiffs Copyrighted works. Based on the
15 analysis of the aforementioned factors, the Court finds that VidAngel has not met this
16 burden.

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b. Plaintiffs Have Demonstrated A Likelihood of Imminent Irreparable Injury.

Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in *eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.*, 547 U.S. 388 (2006), and *Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council*, 555 U.S. 7 (2006), the Ninth Circuit concluded that it is no longer appropriate to apply a presumption of irreparable harm in trademark and copyright cases. *See, e.g., Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Fla. Entm’t Mgmt.*, 736 F.3d 1239, 1249 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Following eBay and Winter, we held that likely irreparable harm must be demonstrated to obtain a preliminary injunction in a copyright infringement case. . . .” It is not enough, moreover, that the claimed harm be irreparable; it must be imminent as well. *Caribbean Marine Servs. Co., Inc. v. Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988); *see also Amylin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Eli Lilly and Co.*, 456 Fed. Appx. 676, 679 (9th Cir. Cal. 2011) (“[E]stablishing a threat of irreparable harm in the indefinite future is not enough”). Speculative injury does not constitute irreparable injury sufficient to warrant granting a preliminary injunction. *Caribbean Marine Servs.*, 844 F.2d at 674 (citing *Goldie’s Bookstore, Inc. v. Superior Court*, 739 F.2d 466, 472 (9th Cir. 1984)). Applying these standards, a party seeking injunctive relief must adduce evidence of likely irreparable harm and may not rely on “unsupported and conclusory statements regarding harm [the plaintiff] might suffer.” *Herb Reed Enterprises*, 736 F.3d at 1250. “Those seeking injunctive relief must proffer evidence

1 sufficient to establish a likelihood of irreparable harm." *Id.* at 1251.

2 Plaintiffs argue that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of a
3 preliminary injunction. First, Plaintiffs argue that VidAngel's service interferes with
4 their basic right to control how, when and through which channels consumers can
5 view their copyrighted works. (Mot. at 27.) Where defendants operate an "infringing
6 service without the normal licensing restrictions imposed by Plaintiffs, [it] interfere[s]
7 with Plaintiffs' ability to control the use and transmission of their Copyrighted works,
8 thereby, causing irreparable injury." *Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys.*, 824 F.
9 Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (C.D. Cal. 2011). Plaintiffs' provided a declaration from Tedd
10 Cittadine, Senior Vice President of Digital Distribution at 20th Century Fox Home
11 Entertainment. Cittadine testified that Plaintiffs' exclusive rights under copyright are
12 critical to providing Plaintiffs the opportunity to earn a return on their substantial
13 investments. (Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 7-8.) Plaintiffs exercise their rights through
14 agreements with authorized distributors. Some licenses grant the licensee an
15 exclusive time window for performing a title. (*Id.* ¶ 15.) The price for such a license
16 is based, in part, on the promise and scope of exclusivity. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs often
17 negotiate higher licensing fees in exchange for granting a licensee the exclusive right
18 to perform a movie or television show during a particular time period. (*Id.*) Because
19 VidAngel operates without any license and performs Plaintiffs' works during
20 negotiated exclusivity periods it interferes with Plaintiffs' exercise of their exclusive
21 rights and frustrates Plaintiffs' ability to negotiate for similar rights in the future. (*Id.*
22 ¶¶ 17, 36.)⁶

23 Second, Plaintiffs argue that VidAngel threatens harm to Plaintiffs'
24 relationships and goodwill with authorized distributors by undermining their ability to
25 provide licensed offerings. (Mot. at 28.) Plaintiffs assert that this harm continues to
26 grow as VidAngel adds more users and encourages them to stream through VidAngel
27 rather than a licensed service. Plaintiffs assert that this poses a threat to the businesses
28 of Plaintiffs' legitimate licensees and, in turn, to Plaintiffs' relationships with them
and the goodwill Plaintiffs have worked to create. (Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 18-22.) Tedd
Cittadine states that Plaintiffs' clients worry about unlicensed services in the market
that compete with their business on unfair terms. (*Id.* ¶ 19.) He also states that
licensees have complained in partnership meetings, and especially in negotiations, that
it is difficult to compete with services like VidAngel who do not act pursuant to
licensing restrictions. (*Id.*) Cittadine states that licensees specifically complain that it
is difficult to compete with unlicensed services' low-cost offerings. (*Id.*)

⁶ Cittadine declared that at the time of his declaration VidAngel was offering (at least) two of Plaintiffs' works—The Martian and Brooklyn—during periods these works are exclusive to an authorized licensee, HBO. (Cittadine Decl. ¶ 30.)

1
2 VidAngel argues that Plaintiff’s alleged harms are speculative and that there is
3 no evidence of actual harm to Plaintiffs other than the declaration of Tedd Cittadine.
4 (Oppo. at 27.) In *Fox TV Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC*, 966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C.
5 2013), the court considered a similar argument in an analogous case. There, the
6 defendants, like VidAngel, operated an unlicensed service that transmitted the
7 plaintiff’s copyrighted performances over the internet. The plaintiffs argued that
8 defendant’s service caused several types of irreparable harm including “undermining
9 Plaintiff’s positions in negotiations” and damaging “Plaintiff’s goodwill with their
10 licensees.” *Id.* at 49. The defendants argued that plaintiff’s alleged harms were
11 “insufficiently speculative and ‘unsupported by any evidence.’” *Id.* at 50. The court
12 found that Plaintiffs had sufficiently supported their alleged harms “with evidence that
13 Defendant had not controverted, including a sworn declaration from a senior executive
14 who states that cable companies have already referenced businesses like [Defendant’s
15 business] in seeking to negotiate lower fees.” *Id.* Similarly, in *ABC v. AEREO, Inc.*,
16 874 F. Supp. 2d 373, (S.D.N.Y. 2012) the court held that harm to a plaintiff’s
17 negotiating position was not speculative where senior executives had provided sworn
18 statements indicating that licensees had expressed concerns about unlicensed service
19 providers in negotiations. (*Id.* at 388-89). Here, the Plaintiffs have provided
20 uncontroverted evidence that VidAngel operates their service without a license, and
21 offers Plaintiff’s works during exclusivity periods that Plaintiff negotiated with
22 licensees. Furthermore, Plaintiffs have offered Tedd Cittadine’s sworn declaration
23 stating that unlicensed services like VidAngel’s had been specifically referenced as a
24 concern during negotiation meetings with licensees. The Court finds that this is a
25 sufficient showing that VidAngel’s service undermines Plaintiffs negotiating position
26 with licensees and also damages goodwill with licensees.

19 VidAngel also contends that any damage their service might cause to Plaintiffs
20 is economic in nature and thus doesn’t qualify as irreparable harm. (Oppo. at 28-29.)
21 However, harm to one’s negotiating position and/or goodwill with licensees is
22 difficult to quantify. In *Fox Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Sys.,*
23 *PLC*, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138, 1147 (C.D. Cal. 2012) the court held that harm to a
24 plaintiff’s negotiating position was irreparable because it was “neither easily
25 calculable, nor easily compensable.”(quoting *Warner Bros. Entm’t, Inc. v. WTV Sys.*,
26 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1013)). “And it is well-established that harm to one’s reputation,
27 goodwill, or relationships-all of which may result from future copyright infringement
28 may constitute irreparable harm.” *Kelly v. Primco Mgmt.*, 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181288 *, 2015 WL 10990368 (C.D. Cal. Jan. 12, 2015); *See, e.g., Rent-A-Center,*
Inc. v. Canyon Television & Appliance Rental, Inc., 944 F.2d 597, 603 (9th Cir. 1991)
(noting that damage to one’s reputation or goodwill, because it is difficult to calculate,
qualifies as irreparable harm).

1
2 VidAngel also asserts that Plaintiff’s delay in filing an injunction belies their
3 claims of irreparable harm. VidAngel states that they notified the Plaintiffs about
4 their service with two letters in July and August 2015. (Oppo. at 22.) VidAngel
5 asserts that these letters described their business model, including the fact that
6 VidAngel: (1) “purchases the DVD or Blu-ray disc for the customer and stores it in a
7 physical vault;” (2) “streams” the contents of the disc to the customer in a filtered
8 format chosen by the customer; and (3) then “re-purchase[s] the disc at a discount
9 from the sale price. . .based on the length of time the customer has owned the disc.”
10 (*Id.*) VidAngel added that it had grown from 43 to 4848 users in just under six
11 months. (*Id.*) Plaintiffs filed for a preliminary injunction on August 22, 2016. (Dkt.
12 No. 27.) VidAngel contends that Plaintiff’s delay of more than one year before
13 requesting a preliminary injunction is inconsistent with a claim of irreparable harm.

14 Courts have held that “long delay before seeking a preliminary injunction
15 implies a lack of urgency and irreparable harm.” *Oakland Trib., Inc. v. Chron. Pub.*
16 *Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). However, “delay is but a single factor to
17 consider in evaluating irreparable injury” and “courts are ‘loath to withhold relief
18 solely on that ground.’” *Arc of Cal. v. Douglas*, 757 F.3d 975, 990 (9th Cir. 2014)
19 (citing *Lydo Enters., Inc. v. City of Las Vegas*, 745 F.2d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 1984)).
20 Furthermore, “tardiness is not particularly probative in the context of ongoing,
21 worsening injuries.”

22 Plaintiffs assert that when they first learned of VidAngel, it was in “limited
23 beta” and had fewer than 5,000 users—which would not lead legitimate streaming
24 licensees to “notice (let alone complain).” (Cittadine Decl. ¶¶ 35-36.) Plaintiffs state
25 that they monitored VidAngel and investigated their claims, and once VidAngel
26 started marketing itself more aggressively, expanded its content offering, and posed a
27 more significant threat of harm, Plaintiffs filed this action and sought a preliminary
28 injunction. *Id.* In, *ABC v. AEREO, Inc.*, the court found no undue delay under
analogous circumstances. There, the plaintiffs “were aware of [the service’s]
existence for roughly a full year before seeking [an] injunction,” 874 F. Supp. 2d at
401. The court ruled that the plaintiffs’ delay, which was “based on the limited
availability of Aereo's service, its status in beta testing, and the prospect that litigation
was unnecessary until it became clear that Aereo posed a viable threat of harm,” was
reasonable and did not suggest that plaintiff’s harms were reparable. *Id.* Additionally,
VidAngel admits it intends to continue to stream Plaintiff’s works and add other
future releases, unless enjoined. (Ehler Decl. Ex. EE at Tr. 27:19-29:14; 30:3-20;
31:6-37:4.) Plaintiffs’ delay in seeking an injunction was reasonable under the
circumstances, their alleged irreparable harms are ongoing, and will likely only
increase absent an injunction.

1
2 Based on the foregoing, the Court holds that Plaintiffs have sufficiently shown
3 that they will suffer irreparable harm in the absence of an injunction.

4 **c. Balance of Hardships Weighs in Favor of the Plaintiffs**

5 An injunction may not issue unless the balance of hardships tips sharply in
6 favor of the moving party. *International Jensen, Inc. v. Metrosound U.S.A., Inc.*, 4
7 F.3d 819, 822 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case, Plaintiffs have demonstrated that the
8 balance of hardships tips sharply in their favor. Defendants claim that an injunction
9 would cause them to suffer an unimaginable financial hardship. However, the Ninth
10 Circuit has held that “[Defendants] cannot complain of the harm that will befall it
11 when properly forced to desist from its infringing activities.” *Triad Sys. Corp. v.*
12 *Southeastern Express Co.*, 64 F.3d 1330, 1338 (9th Cir. 1995). “Where the only
13 hardship that the defendant will suffer is lost profits from an activity which has been
14 shown likely to be infringing, such an argument in defense 'merits little equitable
15 consideration [on an appeal from a preliminary injunction].” *Id.* (citing *Concrete*
Mach. Co. v. Classic Lawn Ornaments, Inc., 843 F.2d 600, 612 (1st Cir. 1988);
accord Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l, Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 523 (9th Cir. 1984)
(in motion for preliminary injunction, district court should not consider the
"devastating effect" of the injunction on the infringer's business.)

16 Accordingly, the Court concludes that the balance of hardships tips sharply in
17 favor of Plaintiffs.

18 **d. A Preliminary Injunction is in the Public Interest**

19
20 VidAngel argues that the public interest in protecting every person’s right to
21 watch filtered content in private would be severely undercut by the issuance of a
22 preliminary injunction. This argument strongly relies on VidAngel’s characterization
23 of its service as the only filtering service under the FMA that supports streaming
24 digital content to mobile devices, tablets, and Smart TV’s. However, the evidence in
25 the record shows that another filtering service, ClearPlay, offers filtering to Google
26 Play users who access authorized streams from GooglePlay’s licensed service.
27 (Bennett Decl. Ex. A. at 5-6.) An injunction in this case would not prevent VidAngel
28 or any other company from providing a filtering service similar to ClearPlay’s, and
thus wouldn’t negatively impact the public interest in watching filtered content in
private.

On the other hand, "it is virtually axiomatic that the public interest can only be

1 served by upholding copyright protections and correspondingly, preventing the
2 misappropriation of skills, creative energies, and resources which are invested in the
3 protected work." *Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. WTV Sys.*, 824 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1015
4 (C.D. Cal. 2011) (citing *Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp.*, 714 F.2d
5 1240, 1255 (3rd Cir. 1983)). Accordingly, the Court concludes that a preliminary
6 injunction is in the public interest.

7 **IV. AMOUNT OF SECURITY**

8 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(c) provides that "[t]he court may issue a
9 preliminary injunction or a temporary restraining order only if the movant gives
10 security in an amount that the court considers proper to pay the costs and damages
11 sustained by any party found to have been wrongfully enjoined or restrained." The
12 Ninth Circuit has recognized that Rule 65(c) invests the district court "with discretion
13 as to the amount of security required, if any." *Barahona-Gomez v. Reno*, 167 F.3d
14 1228, 1237 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing *Doctor's Assoc., Inc. v. Stuart*, 85 F.3d 975, 985 (2d
15 Cir. 1996).

16 VidAngel asks the court to impose a substantial bond of \$50,000,000 because
17 an injunction threatens to put VidAngel out of business before any resolution on the
18 merits and would cause it serious financial loss. VidAngel contends that this
19 substantial bond is required because, "A party that is wrongfully enjoined may be
20 limited to the amount of the bond as its recovery. *Buddy Sys., Inc. v. Exer-Genie, Inc.*,
21 545 F. 2d 1164, 1168 (9th Cir. 1976). However, Defendants also admit that Plaintiffs
22 are well funded and established giants in the entertainment industry. (Oppo. at 35.)
23 Plaintiffs have considerable assets to respond in damages if VidAngel is found to have
24 been wrongfully enjoined.

25 Plaintiffs contend that analogous cases have required security bonds well below
26 \$1 million. *See, e.g., BarryDriller*, 915 F. Supp. 2d at 1149 (rejecting request for \$15
27 million bond in favor of \$250,000); *Zediva*, 824 F. Supp. 2d at 1015 (\$50,000);
28 *FilmOn X*, 966 F. Supp. 2d at 50 (\$150,000). The Court finds no substantial
distinctions between this case and the cases cited by Plaintiffs. Based on the Court's
findings regarding Plaintiffs' likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, the
balance of hardships and public interest, and considering the bond amounts in
analogous cases, the Court finds that a bond in the amount of two hundred and fifty
thousand dollars (\$250,000.00) is satisfactory.

1 **V. CONCLUSION**

2
3 For the foregoing reasons, the Court **GRANTS** Defendant’s Motion for
4 Preliminary Injunction. (Dkt. No. 27.) Defendants, as well as their officers,
5 employees, attorneys, and those acting in concert with them are temporarily enjoined
6 from:

7 (1) circumventing technological measures protecting Plaintiffs’
8 copyrighted works on DVDs, Blu-ray discs, or any other medium;

9 (2) copying Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works, including but not limited to
10 copying the works onto computers or servers;

11 (3) streaming, transmitting or otherwise publicly performing or
12 displaying any of Plaintiffs’ copyrighted works over the Internet (through
13 such websites as VidAngel.com), via web applications (available through
14 platforms such as the Windows App Store, Apple’s App Store, the
15 Amazon App Store, Facebook or Google Play), via portable devices
16 (such as through applications on devices such as iPhones, iPads, Android
17 devices, smart phones or tablets), via media streaming devices (such as
18 Roku, Chromecast or Apple TV), or by means of any other device or
19 process; or

20 (4) engaging in any other activity that violates, directly or indirectly,
21 Plaintiffs anti-circumvention right under § 1201 of the Copyright Act, 17
22 U.S.C. §1201(a), or infringing by any means, directly or indirectly,
23 Plaintiffs’ exclusive rights under § 106 of the Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. §
24 106.

25 Plaintiff is ordered to post a bond in the amount of \$250,000.

26 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

27 Dated: December 12, 2016



28 _____
HONORABLE ANDRÉ BIROTTE JR.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

cc: FISCAL

EXHIBIT "C"

IN RE: VIDANGEL, INC.

ELECTRONIC RECORDING

July 23, 2019



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Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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July 23, 2019

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IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT
DISTRICT OF UTAH, CENTRAL DIVISION

In re:)
) MOTION TO SHORTEN
) TIME AND MOTION TO
) SELL PROPERTY
)
VIDANGEL, INC.,)
) Case No.
Debtor.) 17-29073-KRA
)
)

July 23, 2019 * 10:06 a.m.

OFFICIAL TRANSCRIPT OF ELECTRONIC RECORDING

Reporter: Lindsay Payeur, RPR



July 23, 2019

14

1 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Sure.

2 THE COURT: -- pay creditors or --

3 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well --

4 THE COURT: -- new business models to
5 generate income.

6 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Sure, Your Honor.

7 However, the idea that any investors are going to
8 put in a dime if a Chapter 7 trustee is appointed is
9 fantasy. This --

10 THE COURT: What about a Chapter 11
11 trustee?

12 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Or an 11 trustee.

13 I mean, the idea, I think, behind these --
14 behind anyone's willingness to put money in this is
15 that they believe in the product. They believe in
16 the company. They believe in -- that filtering
17 should be allowed to live and not be crushed.

18 And so that is why people would invest.
19 It's something they believe in. They don't believe
20 in funding Disney -- Disney's legal fees. And they
21 believe that there's meritorious case here. The --

22 THE COURT: So to whom does the debtor owe
23 its fiduciary duty? To potential investors and its
24 customers who want to filter movies? Or to its
25 creditors, like Disney?

July 23, 2019

15

1 MR. ROTHSCHILD: First to its creditors,
2 Your Honor. It's very clear. But that includes
3 administrative creditors. And if there's a chance
4 that they can diminish, you know, a \$68 million
5 verdict and restore the sort of balance to the
6 estate to meritorious claims -- I mean, a remittitur
7 motion in a situation like this is very obvious.

8 And where the jury came back with an award
9 that was larger than any other per-work ever awarded
10 and you've got a situation where you have a key
11 piece of evidence regarding willfulness that was
12 excluded from the jury's purview, it seems that it
13 is VidAngel's duty to its other creditors to fight
14 that and to make sure that the Studios' claims are
15 proportionate to the damage they suffered.

16 We also believe that the Studios suffered
17 no damage. We have evidence on that, and we wanted
18 to provide that, and we weren't allowed to. It was
19 excluded again. In fact, they were benefited
20 because they reached audiences they would not have
21 otherwise.

22 We -- Your Honor, suffice it to say I'm a
23 little bit --

24 THE COURT: Well, you're putting me in a
25 bit of a position to handicap the debtor's

July 23, 2019

16

1 possibility of success on appeal. And I mean, I
2 hate to say this, but thus far, the debtor's
3 litigation strategies have been spectacularly
4 unsuccessful on all fronts.

5 And I have to agree with the Studios that
6 I see the real issue as less about filtering and
7 more about the unauthorized copying of protected
8 work product. And --

9 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Your Honor, we would love
10 to stipulate to an injunction that says that we will
11 not infringe on their copyrights, but that they will
12 allow us to filter. They won't do that.

13 THE COURT: That's -- and that's their
14 prerogative, but the litigation and the damages are
15 a result of unauthorized copying, not of filtering.
16 And -- I mean, I almost wonder if the debtor should
17 be seeking a second legal opinion on the
18 practicalities of proceeding -- continuing to seek
19 vindication of its past streaming model rather than
20 looking forward to new business opportunities that
21 appear to have some prospects of being successful.
22 I'm talking about the streaming or the original
23 content and the other streaming services.

24 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Your Honor, how's this --

25 THE COURT: And we're getting into the

July 23, 2019

17

1 other motion.

2 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Right.

3 THE COURT: But you're right. They are
4 connected.

5 MR. ROTHSCHILD: Well, Your Honor, at the
6 very least, I mean, this is not a material piece.
7 This is tiny, and I think the debtor -- the debtor
8 just needs a little bit of air, and this is a very
9 small bit of air that alleviates their immediate
10 concern that the debtor's cash position is
11 precarious.

12 We can appropriately limit it if the Court
13 wishes, but it really inures to the benefit of all
14 of the parties in interest, especially the
15 creditors, when they've got a limited asset base.
16 And the debtor has done spectacular things in
17 increasing the value of its other businesses for the
18 benefit of its creditors during this case.

19 The Dry Bar Comedy series is
20 extraordinarily successful and worth a lot of money
21 at this point and can be -- and can be turned into a
22 lot of money at some point for the benefit of the
23 Studios, the other businesses and the platform and
24 the technology the debtors have -- the debtor has
25 developed.